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Abstract In classical India, Jain philosophers developed a theory of viewpoints (naya-va¯da)
according to which any statement is always performed within and dependent upon a given
epistemic perspective or viewpoint. The Jainas furnished this epistemology with an (epistemic)
theory of disputation that takes into account the viewpoint in which the main thesis has been
stated.
The main aim of our paper is to delve into the Jain notion of viewpoint-contextualisation and
to develop the elements of a suitable logical system that should offer a reconstruction of the
Jainas’ epistemic theory of disputation.
A crucial step of our project is to approach the Jain theory of disputation with the help of a
theory of meaning for logical constants based on argumentative practices called dialogical logic.
Since in the dialogical framework the meaning of the logical constants is given by the norms or
rules for their use in a debate, it provides a meaning theory closer to the Jain context-sensitive
disputation theory than the main-stream formal model-theoretic semantics.
1 Jain philosophy of logic
In classical India, Jain philosophers developed a theory of viewpoints (naya-va¯da)
according to which any statement is always performed within and dependent upon
a given epistemic perspective or viewpoint. The Jainas furnished this epistemology
with an (epistemic) theory of disputation that takes into account the viewpoint in
which the main thesis has been stated. In nowadays terms, it would be quite natural
to understand such a theory from a modal perspective. But the conceptions of Jain
philosophers do not seem to meet modern standard (and normal) modal logic. The
main reason is that viewpoint bounded epistemic operators are not part of the object
language. Indeed, in the Jain framework embedding of epistemic operators, that allows
travelling between viewpoints, is not possible. More precisely, viewpoint-knowledge is
an implicit epistemic context that bounds the assertion of statements, not an operator
that extends the set of logical constants. Moreover, each viewpoint represents a type
of epistemic access to objects of the domain of discourse. This (epistemic) type defines
a precise frame of the way assertions involving descriptions of those objects are to be
justified. The descriptions are determined by the corresponding epistemic type. That
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2is why the Jain contextual theory has been seen as a logic of assertion1. E.g., if we
are in a viewpoint that denies the existence of universals, sentences such as There is a
property ... are unassertable. Having said that, it is the case that the internal logic of
some viewpoints seems to require a temporal framework.
In section two we develop a formal reconstruction where the epistemic contribution
of each viewpoint amounts to the acceptance of specific norms for the use of singular
terms, quantifiers, identity statements, and assertions. It is important to point out
that in the context of the Indian theories of knowledge each type of knowledge has an
own sort of predicates that apply to the correspondent object of knowledge. For the
sake of simplicity, in this our first formal exploration we will not implement a many-
sorted predication. Such a further development is technically possible for example using
devices such as the ones used in DRT or categorial grammar, but we will leave this
for a future paper. However, we will explain how we can provide abstract means for
this idea in our dialogical reconstruction. The idea behind this is that during a debate
that takes place in a fixed viewpoint the Opponent settles the predicates to be used in
assertions.
The main aim of our paper is to delve into the Jain notion of viewpoint-contextuali-
sation and to develop the elements of a suitable logical system that should offer a
reconstruction of the Jainas’ epistemic theory of disputation. This approach should
prepare the ground for a further development of a frame where the debate between the
different viewpoints could be unified into one general logical system of argumentation.
A crucial step of our project is to approach the Jain theory of disputation with the help
of a theory of meaning for logical constants based on argumentative practices called
dialogical logic. Since in the dialogical framework the meaning of the logical constants is
given by the norms or rules for their use in a debate, it provides a meaning theory closer
to the Jain context-sensitive disputation theory than the main-stream formal model-
theoretic semantics. Accordingly, when we speak of, say, second-order quantifiers we
do not assume a model-theoretical semantics with its underlying set-theory.
We hope that such a reconstruction provides to the modern reader both an insight
into the logical issues at stake in the Jain philosophy and some new perspectives in
philosophy of logic, particularly in the almost lost ancient relation between logic and
argumentation that experiences nowadays a fascinating revival.
The paper is structured in three main sections:
In the following section we present the Jain theory of viewpoints from an epistemolog-
ical perspective.
In the second section we present our dialogical reconstruction of the Jain theory of
disputes.
The third section outlines briefly our next research project, namely the development
of a unified theory of the (dia)logic of disputes where one viewpoint is confronted to
another.
1.1 The Jain theory of viewpoints (naya-va¯da)
Our paper is restricted to the study of Siddhars.igan. i’s tenth century Commentary
on the Handbook of Logic (Nya¯ya-avata¯ra-vivr. ti, NAv). The work of Siddhars.igan. i
constitutes the first commentary to Siddhasena Diva¯kara’s seven century Handbook of
1 See for example Ganeri’s presentation in [4], especially pp. 354-356.
3Logic (Nya¯ya-avata¯ra, NA)2. We chose to work on this period because the lively debates
between different rival schools that took place at that time triggered a development of
the early Jain theory into a comprehensive system. Furthermore, we selected this text
because:
– NAv is a comprehensive work that discusses and systematizes not only most of the
previous gnoseological Jain theories, but also the other Indian schools of thought
of the time.
– NAv had an important influence. Indeed his commentary is widely quoted and
discussed in other Jain treatises such as Mallis.ena’s The flower-spray of the Quo-
dammodo doctrine (Sya¯d-va¯da-man˜jar¯ı, SvM) and Hemacandra’s A Critique of Or-
gan of Knowledge (Prama¯n. a-mı¯ma¯m. sa¯, PMı¯)
3.
Jain philosophers consider that the object of knowledge is multiple (possibly char-
acterized by infinity of aspects) and that when we know we are often focusing on only
one given viewpoint4:
An object qualified by one facet is known as the province of the viewpoint5.
According to NAv the way the knowing agent is intending to apprehend the sub-
ject of a predication while uttering an assertion is what distinguishes epistemically
one viewpoint from another. By nature, a viewpoint-bounded assertion of the kind
mentioned above provides an incomplete description of a given object and complete
knowledge about something is the sum of all the incomplete descriptions6.
Siddhars.igan. i, as other Jain philosophers of this period, proposes a seven-fold clas-
sification of the different viewpoints7.
Ancient preceptors taught that there are seven viewpoints, by means of assuming
seven outlooks that collect together all [possible viewpoints], namely ‘there are the
[following] viewpoints: comprehensive, collective, empirical, direct, verbal, etymological
and factual’. Therefore, also we have described them exactly [in the same way]8.
As will see below Siddhars.igan. i links each viewpoint with a particular philosophy.
In fact the Jain theory of knowledge is an epistemological framework the aim of which is
to include all the main theories of knowledge (in that period of time) Indian philosophy.
In the following section we discuss each of the seven viewpoints presented in the
NAv. Let us stress the fact that each viewpoint summarizes a type of knowledge rep-
resented by different sophisticated schools of thought. Hence the picture of the Indian
2 We here follow the dating of Piotr Balcerowicz: after 620 CA because this work is a post-Din˙na¯ga
as well as post-Dharmak¯ırti work, and before 800 because it is a pre-Haribhadrasu¯ri work. For details,
see [12] pp. iii-xli.
3 The later ‘could even hardly be conceived without Siddhars.igan. i’s [commentary]’, ibid.
4 All the translations of NAv presented in our paper are quotes of Balcerowicz’ own translation
and edition. As for translations of other texts, the name of the translator will be duly indicated.
5 NA 29, [12] p. 83 (English translation) and p. 425 (edition): eka-des´a-vi´sis.t.o’rtho nayasya
vis.ayo matah. .
6 The possibility of human omniscientxd people is not rejected by Jain philosophy, in which ideal
knowledge is considered to be the soteriological project of an individual.
7 Still, there is room to say that the text intended a five-fold classification, according to which
the first four viewpoints, to put it in our author’s own words, are adroit at describing the intrinsic
nature of the objects (artha-svaru¯pa-niru¯pan. a-nipun. a¯na¯m. ) and the other three are apt to examine
speech elements (s´abda-vica¯ra-catura¯n. a¯m), NAv 29.18. Such a five-fold classification is sensible.
Now, by the same argument, we could conclude that there are only two main viewpoints, namely
the object-bounded and the speech-bounded. However, we made the choice to follow his explicit
classification of seven viewpoints.
8 NAv 29.12, [12] p. 97 and p. 440: cirantana¯ca¯ryaih. sarva-san˙gra¯hi-sapta¯bhipra¯ya-parikalpana¯-
dva¯ren. a sapta naya¯h. pratipa¯dita¯h. . tad yatha¯ ‘naigama-san˙graha-vyavaha¯ra-r. jusu¯tra-s´abda-
samabhiru¯d. haivambhu¯ta¯ naya¯’ iti. ato’sma¯bhir api ta eva varn. yante.
4schools of thought offered by the viewpoints is designed in quite broad lines. In fact,
this is part of the strategy of Siddhars.igan. i who did not aim at an exegetical study
of the other schools but classify different types of knowledge. Furthermore and more
generally, according to the Jainas, every school of thought discussed is in some sense
defective, since they do not acknowledge that their own perspective is only one possible
viewpoint among others.
1.1.1 The universal-particular viewpoint (naigama-naya)
The Sanskrit expression naigama (a verbatim translation would be related to sacred
texts) has been used in a technical sense by the Jainas to denote their first viewpoint.
This Sanskrit expression has been exegetically explained in several different ways by
the Jainas and scholars hardly agree on its translation (comprehensive, figurative, tele-
ological, non-distinguished, analytical, etc.). Because of this difficulty, we renounce to
give a translation of naigama and thus call this viewpoint the universal-particular view-
point, following Padmarajiah9 and the already mentioned commentary of Balcerowicz
to his own translation of Siddhars.igan. i’s text.
Indeed, this viewpoint stresses the fact that there is no unique way of epistemic
knowledge: there is the knowledge of the universal and the knowledge of the particular:
[Second meaning] Or ‘naigama’ [means] ‘that which goes in a non unique way’, because
it grasps the characterizing locatee (dharma) and the characterized locus (dharmin)10
as what is either main, either secondary (gun. a)
11.
The Nya¯ya-Vai´ses.ika is the main Indian school of thought that is considered to
characterize this viewpoint. According to this school we experience knowledge, but
knowledge implies the ability to classify things by the recognition of the existence of
common features or universals (sa¯ma¯nya, ja¯ti). From this gnoseological experience the
philosophers of the Nya¯ya-Vai´ses.ika school draw the conclusion that universals exist.
Furthermore since we have not only the experience of a plurality of particularizing
gnoseological processes but also the experience that the latter are different from the
first (the experience of universal knowledge) this school concludes that there exist
particulars and that they are different from universals.
The main assumption is that each type of gnoseological process has an object of
knowledge of its own. Now, since we are able to distinguish the gnoseological process by
the means of which we come to know about this particular object, say a cow, from the
process by the means of which we apprehend the concept of, say, cowness, we are also
able to distinguish the objects of knowledge involved in those gnoseological processes,
namely: the particular object, cow, and the universal object, cowness12.
9 Cf. [13] p. 314 ff.
10 There are controversies about the translation of these two terms. Dharma cannot be properly
translated as property because a dharma might be a quality, a property or an abstract universal,
as well as a concrete substance. Hence, the proposal accepted by most scholars to translate them as
locatee and locus, following Matilal’s proposal to see the Indian model of logic as dealing with locali-
sation: the Sanskrit logicians tried to explain the structure of the ‘atomic’ qualificative knowledge
with a model that I have called the ‘property-location’ model, [11] pp. 26-27.
11 PKM, [14] p. 677: nigamo hi san˙kalpah. , tatra bhavas-tat-prayojano va¯ naigamah. [...] yad-va¯
na-ekan˙-ga¯mo naigamo dharma-dharmin. or-gun. a-pradha¯na-bha¯vena vis.ay¯ı-karan. a¯t. The transla-
tion is from one of the authors.
12 NAv 29.14, [12] p. 98 and p. 443: evam. ca prama¯n. ayati: paraspara-vi´slis.t.au sa¯ma¯nya-vi´ses.au,
pa¯rthakyenopalabdher, iha yad yat pa¯rthakyenopalabhyate tat tat paraspara-vi´slis.t.am. dravyam. ,
tad yatha¯ devadatta-yajn˜adatta¯v iti, pa¯rthakyena copalabhyete sa¯ma¯nyavi´ses. a¯v, atah. paraspara-
vibhinna¯v iti.
5And [the followers of the Nya¯ya-Vai´ses.ika school] adduces the following proof
13:
Thesis. The universal and the particular are disjoined from each other.
Reason. Because they are comprehended separately.
Inference. In this world, whatever substances are comprehended separately, they are
disjoined from each other; for instance [the process by which we grasp the proper
names] Devadatta and Yajn˜adatta [involves the knowledge of two disjoined individu-
als].
Application. And indeed the universal and the particular are comprehended sepa-
rately.
Conclusion. Hence they are disjoined from each other.
In fact, Siddhars.igan. i speaks about ni-gama coming from ni´scita-gamanam. (de-
termined comprehension) in the sense of being able to grasp a multiple object14. In
our dialogical reconstruction of section two we draw the following consequences of
Siddhars.igan. i’s talk of a multiple object : while asserting some predication about a
given particular the utterer is also committed to the existence of the correspondent
property involved in that predication. Furthermore, in the logical context, it is im-
portant to notice that in a number of Indian teachings universals are always linked
through inherence (samava¯ya) to a particular and that a universal is not contained
in another universal15. Thus, though universals are disjoint elements of the domain of
discourse, and it is possible to quantify over them, the assertions in which they are em-
bedded always involves the predication of particulars. Thus, assertions always involve
a multiplicity, namely the universal and a correspondent particular. The upshot of this
is second-order quantification, not a higher-order one. The logic underlying the first
viewpoint combines then, second-order with first-order quantifiers (see section two).
According to our text NAv 29.14 the first viewpoint includes the second (highest
and intermediate universals), third (intermediate particulars) and fourth viewpoint
(ultimate particulars):
Indeed, this [viewpoint] intends:
– The highest universal consisting in existence and
– [Lower] intermediate universals viz. substantiality, qualitativeness and the
state of being of an object of an action, furthermore, [it intends]
– Ultimate particulars, consisting in [specific] forms not common to all, as well
as
– Intermediate particulars, capable of being distinguished [from particulars that
have] other form by [the cognition of] recurrent continuity, because [these partic-
ulars] are in their intrinsic nature absolutely detached from the universal16.
In our reconstruction the language must take two kinds of objects into account:
particulars and universals. Moreover, it must give an account for the inherence relation
that may hold between some universals and some particulars. The formal counterparts
of these conditions are: first-order predicates, individual constants, first-order predi-
cation and quantification. Now the fact that there is no possible inherence between
13 The Sanskrit expression sa¯dhana or pan˜ca¯vayava-va¯kya is usually translated as syllogism, but
we are here following the suggestion of Piotr Balcerowicz in [12] p. xl to translate it as proof in
order not to confuse this form of argumentation with the Aristotelian one.
14 NAv 29.12.
15 Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer that draw our attention to this fact of Indian Logic.
16 NAv 29.14, [12] p. 98 and p. 442: ayam. hi satta¯-laks.an. am. maha¯-sa¯ma¯nyam ava¯ntara-
sa¯ma¯nya¯ni ca dravyatva-gun. atva-karmatva¯d¯ıni tatha¯ntya¯n vi´ses. a¯n sakala¯sa¯dha¯ran. a-ru¯pa-
laks.an. a¯n ava¯ntara-vi´ses. a¯m. s´ ca¯peks.aya¯ para-ru¯pa-vya¯vartana-ks.ama¯n sa¯ma¯nya¯d atyanta-
vinirlut.hita-svaru¯pa¯n abhipraiti. We thereby thank one of the reviewers of this paper, who stressed
the fact that antya-vi´ses.a (used by Siddhars.igan. i in the sense ultimate particular) is a technical
expression from the Vai´ses.ika school, in which it designates the extreme counterpart of highest
universals in a scale of increasing and decreasing generality.
6universals is captured by the idea that there is no predication of predicates. But we
must be able to express that there are such things as universals in our domain. Thus we
need quantification on predicates, i.e. second-order quantification, but not higher-order
one.
1.1.2 The summarizing viewpoint (sam. graha-naya)
The idea behind the summarizing viewpoint17 is that the perceptible world is the world
of changes but, according to this gnoseological perspective, change is not knowable.
Knowledge is about what is permanent. Hence, the goal of knowledge is to grasp the
unity between two apparently different particular objects by realizing that they are
mere manifestations of the same universal. For example, different particular pots are
but instances of the universal potness. NAv 29.15 presents this point in the following
way:
The collective [viewpoint] is that which collects together, i.e. it takes the world as
consisting in the universal, by means of completely ruling out the particular18.
The Indian schools considered by the Jainas as representing this viewpoint are the
Monist schools, especially the Advaita-veda¯nta and the Sa¯m. khya. According to them,
(What is illusionary known as) the particulars are (in fact) the Being alone because
they are not different from this Being19.
For example, when we say pot, all the manifestations of the pot merge into a unity,
due to their potness20.
The logic underlying this viewpoint consists of the following elements (see section
three):
1) Universals: second-order quantifiers.
2) No quantification over particulars, no universals contained in other universals:
neither first-order nor higher-order quantifiers.
3) Particulars are nothing but manifestations of universals: summarizing rule.
Let us explain roughly the idea behind the idea of what we call the summarizing
rule. According to this viewpoint, sentences such as This object is a pot and that object
on the table is a pot, allows us to disregard the particularity that differentiate both
objects and consider them nothing but manifestations of the universal potness. The
point is that in relation to the predicate that expresses the universal the bearer of the
expression this object is undistinguishable from the bearer of the expression that object.
This could be expressed by a rule that allows to assert the equality of two terms (this
17 Notice that with the expression summarizing, we translate literally the Sanskrit expression
sam. graha, that conveys the idea of bringing together several distinct elements. We thank an anony-
mous reviewer for suggesting this translation that follows the one of Frauwallner in his History of
Indian Philosophy, vol. I-II. Translated from the original German by V. M. Bedekar. Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidas, (1953) 1997.
18 NAv 29.15, [12] p. 99 and p. 443: san˙gr.hn. a¯ty as´es.a-vi´ses.a-tirodha¯na-dva¯ren. a sa¯ma¯nya-
ru¯pataya¯ jagad a¯datta iti san˙grahah. . The PKM is even more clear concerning this idea of col-
lecting together in the sense of focusing on similarities in [14] p.677: [It is called] the summarizing
[viewpoint] because, having presented things whose difference has been ruled out, it collects them
together in a unity that is not against their genus (ja¯ti) (sva-ja¯ty-avirodhena-ekadhyam-upan¯ıya-
artha¯n-a¯kra¯nta-bheda¯n samasta-grahan. a¯t-sam. grahah. ).
19 NAv 29.15, [12] p. 99 and p. 444: bha¯va-ma¯tram. vi´ses. a¯s, tad-avyatiriktatva¯d. We could draw a
parallel with this conception and the philosophy of Parmenides in Ancient Greece.
20 PKM, [14] p. 877: tatha¯ ‘ghat.ah. ’ ity-ukte nikhila-ghat.a-vyakt¯ına¯m. ghat.atvena-ekatva-
sam. grahah. . The translation is from of one of the authors.
7object, that object) in relation to a predicate (to be a pot) if they share this very same
predicate. This rule can be expressed more adequately in a formal framework that goes
beyond standard semantics for first-order logic, and where the summarizing process is
formulated only at the ontological level (as explained in our discussion of the fourth
viewpoint).
1.1.3 The viewpoint of worldly transactions (vyavaha¯ra-naya)
In this viewpoint, only that which has impact on human actions is knowable:
The empirical [viewpoint is explained] as practical use, or as such the outlook with
which [something] is used practically by common people21.
According to this viewpoint, that represents the type of theory of knowledge of
schools such as the one of the Ca¯rva¯kas, the intermediate particulars and not the
universals can be subject of knowledge. Very briefly, the argument runs as follow: if
the highest universal would be knowable, then it would be possible to know everything.
However, we never experience such a cognitive ability22.
A similar counterargument is developed against the knowability of intermediate
universals, since their knowledge would commit us to the knowledge of every instantia-
tion of such universals. Our text provides also an argument against the fourth viewpoint
that links knowability, persistence and daily practice. Knowledge is about what is of
use in daily life, but, as we will discuss below, the ultimate particulars of the fourth
viewpoint, the infinitesimal atoms, are not persistent (each atomic infinitesimal is spe-
cific to a particular moment) and are thus of no use in daily life. Hence, ultimate
particulars, cannot be the subject of knowledge23.
In principle, the basic underlying logic assumes no other logical devices than the
ones provided by first-order quantification. We say in principle, since we do not delve
here into the inner structure of intermediate particulars. In fact, the underlying logic of
the fourth viewpoint requires a sophisticated formal frame where this (third) viewpoint
could be seen as a special case in which objects of knowledge are not atomized into
ultimate elements.
1.1.4 The viewpoint of ultimate particulars (r. ju-su¯tra-naya)
In this viewpoint24, only infinitesimal atoms (parama¯n. u) can be known. These infinites-
imal atoms are ultimate particulars in the sense that they constitute the ultimate units
21 NAv.29.16, [12] p. 100 and p. 445: vyavaharan. am. vyavahriyate va¯nena laukikair abhipra¯yen. eti
vyavaha¯rah.
22 Ibid.: The universal with no beginning nor end, [numerically] one, considered by the col-
lective [viewpoint], [does] not [constitute] the scope of a cognitive criterion because there is
no such experience (na sa¯ma¯nyam ana¯di-nidhanam ekam. san˙gra¯ha¯bhimatam. prama¯n. a-bhu¯mis,
tatha¯nubhava¯bha¯va¯t.).
23 Ibid.: The particulars characterized by infinitesimal atoms [that] perish in a moment can
never effect people’s everyday life practice, so these do not constitute the real thing, because
only [entities that are] conducive to people’s everyday practice are real things (ks.an. a-ks.ayi-
parama¯n. u-laks.an. a¯ vi´ses. a¯ na kan˜cana loka-vyavaha¯ram uparacayanti, tan na te vastu-ru¯pa¯, loka-
vyavaha¯ropayogina¯m. eva vastutva¯d.).
24 The verbatim Sanskrit expression r.ju-su¯tra-naya has been often translated as the straight view-
point. The problem is that it is not that easy to make this translation compatible with Siddhars.igan. i’s
own understanding of the fourth viewpoint. Thus, we chose here too not to give a translation of r.ju-
su¯tra but to characterize this viewpoint as the one where its object of knowledge are ultimate
particulars.
8in the process of decomposition of what exists. These infinitesimal atoms occur only
here and now. They are not persistent. Knowledge of the existence of a persistent
particular pot is but an illusion due to the presence of an infinitesimal atom here and
now. Knowing the past or the future is impossible because, according to this viewpoint,
empirical induction is not granted. Knowledge experiences have a scope of efficiency re-
stricted to the here and now. More precisely, through the knowledge of an infinitesimal
atom at a given time-place location t1 and the successive knowledge of an infinitesimal
atom at another time-place location t2, I cannot infer the identity of both and, from
this, the existence of a persistent object from t1 to t2:
The direct [viewpoint is explained as follow]: [it] draws out, [i.e.] plainly demonstrates
- directly, [i.e.] in a straight manner, [or] not crookedly, [i.e.] by evading past and future
bends [of the real thing] - the form of the real thing, whose transient occurrence [falls
to] the present moment25.
According to our author, the school of the Tatha¯gata is a representative of this
viewpoint.
The underlying logic of this viewpoint requires a far more sophisticated formal
instrument than the one of the other viewpoints. Our, exploratory, proposal is to
abandon the standard first-order and second-order frame in favour of a temporally
structured semantics. In other words, semantics that takes into account scenarios. Such
scenarios could be thought of as time points (moments) or time-place points (more
generally, they could be conceived as states of information (of different agents), facts,
etc.). However this is not enough, since the logic of this viewpoint requires a notion
of individual that is both compatible with the idea that the object of knowledge is at
the very end an ultimate particular and adequate for the underlying time-place points
semantics. According to our understanding, Hintikka’s notion of a world-line satisfies
the conditions mentioned above26. Indeed, in such a theory an individual is understood
as a (partial) function that might pick up one object from the domain of a given scenario
t, called the aspect of the individual at t (of this aspect, one can assert at t, for example,
that it satisfies the predicate A) and an object from the domain of a different scenario
t’ (of this other aspect, one can assert at t’, for example, that it satisfies the predicate
B and not the predicate A). Clearly, we propose to call the objects of the domain of a
scenario ultimate particulars (and not aspects). No object of the domain of a scenario
can be compared with another object of a different scenario. A singular term, such as
constant k, will refer in different t-scenarios (moments, time-place points), to different
ultimate particulars. In such a frame, it could well be the case that we have knowledge
that enables us to recognize that a constant k has a bearer at scenario t, and that this
bearer might be a ultimate particular of an individual in some other scenario t’, but
we might fail to know which is the corresponding individual and the specific scenario
t’ at stake. Moreover, it is not granted that we have the knowledge that the constant
k of different scenarios is an aspect (ultimate particular), of the same individual. If
this knowledge is available we might see the k at, say, t and t’, as ultimate particulars
that constitute the individual, call it, g. We represent this case as the drawing of a
line that links two objects of different scenarios. Once more, knowledge is about the
25 NAv 29.17, [12] p. 101 and p. 446: r.ju pragun. am akut.ilam at¯ıta¯na¯gata-vakra-paritya¯ga¯d var-
tama¯na-ks.an. a-vivarti-vastuno ru¯pam. su¯trayati nis.t.an˙kitam. dars´ayat¯ıti r. jusu¯trah. . There is a typ-
ical device in Sanskrit commentary texts that consists in annotating the technical terms by more
common terms. For example here, pragun. am (in a straight manner), is added to r.ju (directly);
and su¯trayati (draws out) is explained by the following second term which has a similar meaning
nis.t.an˙kitam. dars´ayati (plainly demonstrates, in Balcerowicz’ terms), hence the feeling of repetition.
26 Cf. [6].
9ultimate particulars and assertions (and the involved predications) are grounded on
them. According to this viewpoint the third viewpoint makes the mistaken assumptions
that individuals (functions) and not ultimate particulars (element of the t-scenarios) are
the objects of knowledge, and that the knowledge required to link ultimate particulars
is always granted. In such a framework, the summarizing rule of the second viewpoint
can be formulated in a purely ontological manner in the following way: If two objects
of the domain of two different scenarios share the same property, then a world-line
can be drawn. Hence each world-line will be property-bound27. Hintikka’s semantics
is model-theoretical, however we will embed this semantics in a dialogical framework,
where different sorts of individual terms are defined.
Notice that, as pointed out before, we do not preclude that this (and the other
viewpoints) has an own sort of predicates that apply to their object of knowledge.
1.1.5 The viewpoint of synonymy (s´abda-naya)
Siddhars.igan. i calls this viewpoint the speech-bound (s´abda-naya) viewpoint. Unfortu-
nately, he also points out that the following two are speech-bound. This might raise
the suspicion that, after all, there are not seven but only five viewpoints, and that
the latter is sub-classified in three28. As mentioned above, we made the choice to fol-
low the author’s explicit seven-fold classification and we will continue to stick to this
decision here. However, for reasons that will be clear further on we will call the fifth
viewpoint the viewpoint of synonymy - though we do not claim that it is a translation
of s´abda-naya29.
The main philosophical tenet of all the three speech-bound viewpoints, is not only
that every word denotes an object, but that language and object are linked by a relation
that makes them inseparable30, or at least that there is no other epistemic access to
an object than by the means of language31. Indeed, according to NAv 29.18:
Thesis. Object is not, [by any means,] different from word32.
Reason. Because that [object] is known when that [word] is known.
Inference. In this world, if x is known when y is known, then x turns out to be not
different from y; for instance: the intrinsic nature of that very [word] when the word
is known.
Application. And [indeed] object is known when word is known.
27 More generally, in such a framework, the other two viewpoints can be seen in the following way:
The first viewpoint is the case where there is only one scenario with two kinds of individuals, namely
universals and (intermediate) particulars. Universals have as values bunches of objects of a domain
(bunches can be thought of as classes but not necessarily so). Individuals will then be conceived as
a kind of relations and not functions. Particular-individuals take as values an object of the domain
that constitutes one of the bunches that define a universal. In other words, particulars will always be
part of a universal, even in the special case that we do not know to which. Second-order quantifiers
take universal-individuals as values, and first-order quantifiers take particular-individuals as values.
Singular constants are interpreted as the values of particular-individuals.
The second viewpoint is the case where there is (possibly) more than one scenario, with only one
kind of individuals, namely universals, defined as before and over which second-order quantification
range.
28 In fact, one anonymous reviewer contested the seven-fold presentation.
29 By the way, this choice has also been taken by Padmarajiah in [13] p. 320 ff.
30 Nowadays we would call this an internal relation.
31 On our view, this suggests that model-theoretic semantics is not a suitable approach to the
theory of meaning underlying the speech-bound viewpoints.
32 The Sanskrit term is s´abda. Balcerowicz chooses, and rightly so, the translation speech element.
However, for the sake of stressing the point of the argument, we opted for the translation word, which
perfectly matches the use of this term in this precise context. For the same reasons, we substituted
Balcerowicz’s translation of prat¯ıta (cognised) with the participle known.
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Conclusion. Hence that [object] is not different from this [word]33.
Interesting is the fact, that our author does not specify any specific Indian school
of thought that represent the speech-bound viewpoints.
The main claim of the fifth viewpoint is that the epistemic access to identity amounts
to synonymy, and more precisely synonymy in Sanskrit. Accordingly, if two different
Sanskrit words are falsely thought to have the same meaning, then two different objects
might be wrongly taken as being the same. In fact, synonymy is grounded on the proper
knowledge of the usage of the language. Therefore, knowledge of Sanskrit is intrinsically
linked to a sound knowledge of the world. This applies particularly to proper names
that, according to the speech-bound viewpoints, have always a specific meaning behind.
Actually, recognition of identities by means of mastering the knowledge of synonymy
is the main way to knowledge described by the fifth viewpoint:
The verbal34 [viewpoint] intends, as they say, by the force of understanding, one object
for all such linguistic units, like Indra, S´akra and Purandara, etc., that are used - in
accordance with the usage - to denote a specific object35.
The underlying logic requires devices such as definite descriptions, formulated as
terms and that convey the meaning of proper names. The framework must also assume
that some definite descriptions convey meanings established as synonymous by a given
linguistic community. Furthermore, the standard substitution rule for singular terms
must be grounded on the synonymy of definite descriptions. This device must also be
extended to indefinite descriptions.
1.1.6 The viewpoint of semantic analysis (samabhiru¯d. ha-naya)
The Sanskrit term for this viewpoint is samabhiru¯d. ha-naya. This term has been trans-
lated as etymological (Balcerowicz, Padmarajiah)36, subtle (Bhattacharya, Vidhyab-
husana )37 and specific (Goshal, Tatia)38. We made the choice to call it semantic
analysis.
The main claim of this viewpoint is that a proper and accurate understanding of the
meaning (or descriptive content) conveyed by a given speech unit leads to a unique and
fixed epistemic access to a particular object, that does not go over to another object. For
short, the descriptive content of a linguistic expression characterizes a unique object.
33 NAv 29.18, [12] p. 104 and p. 449: prama¯n. a¯d iti bru¯mah. . tatha¯ hi: na vyatirikto’rthah. s´abda¯t,
tat-prat¯ıtau tasya prat¯ıyama¯natva¯d, iha yat-prat¯ıtau yat prat¯ıyate tat tato’vyatiriktam. bhavati,
tad yatha¯ s´abde prat¯ıyama¯ne tasyaiva svaru¯pam. , prat¯ıyate ca s´abde prat¯ıyama¯ne’rtha, ’to’sau
tato’vyatirikta iti..
34 Balcerowicz, whose translation we follow here, calls the fifth viewpoint verbal.
35 Ibid.: s´abdo: ru¯d. hito ya¯vanto dhvanayah. kasmim. s´cid arthe pravartante; yathendra-s´akra-
purandara¯dayah. , tes. a¯m. sarves. a¯m apy ekam artham abhipraiti kila prat¯ıtivas´a¯d. As already men-
tioned, we follow mainly Balcerowicz’ translation. Another possibile translation suggested by an
anonymous reviewer is the following: As it is reported (kila) the word [in so far as it is] employed
in its conventional meaning aims with the help of a complete understanding (prat¯ıtivas´a¯d) at one
and the same object for all those expressions which refer to some object, such as Indra, S´akra,
Purandara, etc.
36 P. Balcerowicz in [12] p. 105 ff. and Y. J. Padmarajiah in [13] p. 321 ff.
37 H. S. Bhattacharya in his edition of the Prama¯n. a-naya-tattva¯loka¯lan˙ka¯rah. of Va¯di Devasu¯ri,
Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal, Bombay, 1967, p. 530 ff. And S. C. Vidhabhusana in his History of the
Mediaeval School of Indian Logic, Calcutta University, 1907, e.g. p. 12.
38 S. C. Goshal in his edition and translation of the Par¯ıks. a¯mukham in The sacred books of the
Jainas vol. 11, Today and Tomorrow’s printers and publishers, Delhi, 1990, p. 202. And N. Tatia in
his edition and translation of the Tattva¯rtha Su¯tra of Uma¯sva¯ti, Lanham, MD: Rowman Altamira,
1994.
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According to this viewpoint, there is a one-to-one correspondence between descriptions
and their objects39. In other words, whereas in the fifth viewpoint, the three names
Indra, S´akra and Purandara stand for the same object of knowledge, namely the king
of gods, each denotes a distinct object of knowledge in the sixth viewpoint, namely [the
one who possess] divine supremacy, [the one who has the] ownership of might and [the
one who posses the] ability to destroy the strongholds. Accordingly, the sixth viewpoint
denies synonymy NAv 29.20:
Similarly, S´akra (‘possessed of might’) [is called as such] because of might; Purandara
(‘destroyer of strongholds’) [is called as such] because of destroying of strongholds -
by these and other [examples] one [can] demonstrate that all speech elements have
different objects (denotata).[...]
So, there are no linguistic units which denote one [and the same external] object
(denotatum)40.
The underlying logic of this viewpoint should be grounded in a formulation of
definite (and indefinite) descriptions that disallows substitution salva veritate.
1.1.7 The such-like viewpoint (evam. bhu¯ta-naya)
The Sanskrit term for this viewpoint is evam. bhu¯ta-naya. This term has been translated
as factual (Balcerowicz)41, such-like (Bhattacharya, Padmarajiah, Vidhyabhusana)42
and active (Goshal, Tatia)43. We made the choice to follow the translation of Bhat-
tacharya, Padmarajiah, and Vidhyabhusana.
This viewpoint shares the one name/description-one object approach of the sixth
viewpoint discussed above. In fact, it might be argued that it is not a viewpoint of its
own but a further precise development of the sixth viewpoint. Indeed, this viewpoint
parameterizes the descriptions mentioned in the viewpoint of semantic analysis to
a given time-place reference point. For short, the descriptive content of a linguistic
expression characterizes a unique object of the present. Thus, an object can be called
with a given name, (e.g. Indra) if and only if that object satisfies now and here the
property conveyed by the meaning of the name (in our case, [the one who posses] divine
supremacy). Another way to see the relation with the sixth viewpoint is a change of the
word-object perspective: whereas the viewpoint of semantic analysis focuses on how the
meaning conveyed by names lead to the knowledge of an object, the such-like viewpoint
focuses on the conditions an object has to satisfy in order to be called/described as such
by a given linguistic expression. In our author’s own words (translated by Balcerowicz):
Therefore, only in such a moment, when there exists the factor [accountable for] the
grammatical formation [of the speech element ‘x ’] in a full-fledged form, the object
39 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this formulation that, despite his scepticism renders ac-
curately Siddhars.igan. i’s own description - see text quoted below.
40 NAv 29.20, [12] p. 106 and p. 452: evam. s´akana¯c chakrah. , pu¯r-da¯ran. a¯t purandara ity-a¯di
bhinna¯rthatvam. sarva-s´abda¯na¯m. dars´ayati [...] tan naika¯rtha-va¯cino dhvanayah. santi.
41 Cf. [12] p. 105 ff.
42 Padmarajiah in [13] p. 321 ff. H. S. Bhattacharya in his edition of the Prama¯n. a-naya-
tattva¯loka¯lan˙ka¯rah. of Va¯di Devasu¯ri, Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal, Bombay, 1967, p. 530 ff. And
S. C. Vidhabhusana in his History of the Mediaeval School of Indian Logic, Calcutta University,
1907, e.g. p. 12.
43 S. C. Goshal in his edition and translation of the Par¯ıks. a¯mukham in The sacred books of the
Jainas vol. 11, Today and Tomorrow’s printers and publishers, Delhi, 1990, p. 202. And N. Tatia in
his edition and translation of the Tattva¯rtha Su¯tra of Uma¯sva¯ti, Lanham, MD: Rowman Altamira,
1994.
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x can be denoted by the speech-element ‘x ’. Such is [the gist of] the factual44 [view-
point]45.
The underlying logic requires a time-place framework that should both accomplish
the indexation of definite description, and disallow of substitution of singular terms.
This should also hold for indefinite descriptions.
2 A dialogical approach
The aim of this section is to provide the elements of a dialogical reconstruction of the
logic of debates underlying each of the viewpoints as discussed in our text. We do not
claim that this reconstruction captures all the epistemological features involved in each
viewpoint. However, we hope both that the elements of the formal frame developed
should provide insights in (the philosophy of) logic at stake and that it motivates
further explorations.
More specifically, dialogical logic has a fine-grained theory of meaning that can re-
flect different levels of meaning changes. This is, in fact the main point of the dialogical
approach to pluralism. For short, dialogic distinguishes two levels of meanings and one
level where validity is defined. The rock bottom of meaning is represented by what is
called the particle-rules that provides the local meaning of the logical constants. It is
a classical result of dialogic that several different logics such as intuitionistic logic and
classical logic share the same local understanding of negation. It is changes at the higher
level of the so-called structural rules that trigger different kinds of winning strategies.
The main point of our formal reconstruction is to implement such fine-grained analysis
of changes of meaning while formulating the logic that underlies each viewpoint.
It is important to point out that, as mentioned in the introduction, it might be
argued that each type of knowledge has an own sort of predicates that apply to the
correspondent object of knowledge. For the sake of simplicity, in this our first formal
exploration we will not implement a many-sorted predication. However the dialogical
framework has the means to provide an abstract formulation of the use of viewpoint-
restricted predicates in a debate. Briefly, the idea is that, during a debate that takes
place in a fixed viewpoint, the Opponent is the one who settles the predicates that can
be used in assertions. The upshot of this idea is slightly different for the first and second
viewpoints than for the other ones, for which there is no quantification on predicates.
2.1 Why dialogical logic?
There are some typical devices a contemporary reader of Indian theses in logic has
to pay attention to. We have selected the following ones which motivate the choice of
dialogical logic for our reconstruction:
The strong link between meaning and argumentative practices. And the intrinsic
link between language and object. Since in the Indian tradition the approach to logic
and gnoseology is often cast in a complex nest of arguments and counterarguments,
it would be highly desirable to be able to develop the reconstruction of this thought
44 Recall that Balcerowicz call this viewpoint factual.
45 NAv 29.21, [12], p. 107 and p. 453: yatra ks.an. e vyutpatti-nimittam avikalam asti tasminn eva
so’rthas tac-chabdena va¯cya ity evam. bhu¯tah. .
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in a formal framework in which the meaning and the justifiability of a statement are
given by norms governing an argumentative debate . Moreover, a framework where - as
mentioned in the discussion of the speech-bound viewpoints - language and object are
intrinsically linked is desirable. Dialogical logic meets this condition and thus provides
a theory of meaning close to the Jain approach. In dialogical logic, logical constants get
their meaning through rules governing their use in a language game, and there are two
kinds of rules: the particle rules determine the core local meaning of logical constants
and the structural rules put additional constraints on justifiability of statements where
these logical constants occur. In other words meaning and justification conditions are
given with respect to ruled argumentative practices: the dialogical theory of meaning
is therefore close to the Jain context-sensitive theory.
A pluralist approach. The theory of viewpoints is a pluralist approach insofar as
it describes different types of knowledge. Furthermore the sya¯dva¯da aims at justifying
how these different conflicting views can all be defended so far as one pays attention
to the contextualisation process. The two kinds of rules in dialogical logic, mentioned
above, provide the means of a formal reconstruction of naya-va¯da that meets the Jain
form of pluralism. As a matter of fact the dialogical approach can be used to define
different kinds of dialogical games by defining distinct systems of game rules46, which
makes the dialogical approach a pluralist-friendly framework.
In the remaining of this section we introduce the language upon which our dialogical
approach is built. We also present successively the particle and structural rules for
our dialogical approach. Finally we use those rules to design seven different dialogical
systems the differences of which express the differences between the seven viewpoints,
and we illustrate our approach with examples.
2.2 The language
Definition 1 (Alphabet) Our language L is built upon:
- A denumerable set FOv of first-order variables symbols x0, x1, ....
- A denumerable set SOV of monadic second-order variables symbols X0, X1, ....
- A denumerable set R of unary predicate symbols (or constants) P1, P2, ....
- The connectives {∧,∨,→,¬}
- The quantifiers {∀, ∃}
- The ι (iota) operator.
- A denumerable set C of constants: k1, k2, ...
Definition 2 (Terms) A term can be:
a. A first-order variable.
b. A constant from C.
c. An expression of the form (ιx)(Px) where x is a first-order variable and P is a
unary predicate.
Remarks: Let us motivate the choice of such a language. Since there is a viewpoint
(the first one) in which two kinds (universals and particulars) of objects are admitted,
we need a language in which we can quantify on both and this is precisely the purpose of
46 see e.g. [8].
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introducing second-order quantification. On the other hand, we must not allow higher-
order quantification: according to the Indian conception, no universal can inhere in
another universal and our language matches this conception insofar as a predicate
symbol alone is not a term. In other words, we do not accept second-order predication:
expressions of the form PR, where P and R are predicates, are not formulas (see
definition 3 below).
We have restricted predicate symbols to the unary case. In fact we assume - but we
will not go into details - that assertions with predicates of bigger arity can be read as
expressing complex properties of an object. Such an approach is a bit unusual in formal
logic, but other traditions of formal reconstruction of natural language, such as DRT,
sometimes make this assumption too. The point is that the generalization to predicates
of arbitrary arity could blur the parallel with the Indian conception of universals: it is
far from obvious, for example, that a binary relation can be thought of as a universal.
Because we use the ι operator as a primitive, a term can be a complex expression of the
form (ιx)(Px). The point of adding such expressions as terms is to give an account of
the difference between the first four viewpoints and the last three ones. Such expressions
are definite expressions and are to be read as the x such that...: in fact they are terms
version of quantified assertions of the form There is a unique x such that.... Conversely
indefinite descriptions can be understood as existential statements of the form There
is an x such that, and one can also design term versions of these. Strictly speaking, we
should add such terms in our language, as we pointed out when discussing the three
speech-bound viewpoints. But we do not treat indefinite descriptions for the sake of
simplicity, and because implementing definite description already gives a clear grasp
of the specificity of the speech-bound viewpoints compared to the other ones.
Definition 3 (Formulas) Let t, u be terms and P ∈ R, then t = u and Pt are atomic
formulas. Complex formulas are given according to the following clauses:
(i) If ϕ is an atomic formula then ϕ is a formula.
(ii) If ϕ,ψ are formulas then (ϕ ∧ ψ), (ϕ ∨ ψ), (ϕ→ ψ), (¬ϕ) are formulas.
(iii) If ϕ is a formula and x a first-order variable, then ∀xϕ and ∃xϕ are formulas.
(iv) If ϕ is a formula and X a second-order variable, then ∀Xϕ and ∃Xϕ are formulas.
(v) Nothing else is a formula.
Extending the language. In order to give a dialogical approach, we need the following
additional devices:
Definition 4 (Labels, forces and scenarios) We start by adding the following to
our language:
- Two labels O and P, standing for the players (respectively Opponent and Propo-
nent). It is useful to introduce the metavariables X and Y (with X 6= Y) for these
labels.
- Two force symbols ! and ?
We also use a denumerable list of labels s1, s2, . . . standing for scenarios (as we
introduced them when discussing the viewpoint of ultimate particulars, and which we
will also use for the dialogical reconstruction of the such-like viewpoint).
Definition 5 (Moves) By a move we mean an expression of the form X-fe such
that:
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- X ∈ {O,P},
- f ∈ {!, ?}47,
- e is either a formula or taken from {R,L,∨, ∃, k, P} where k ∈ Term1 ∪ Term2,
P ∈ R and R,L stand respectively for “Right-hand side” and “Left-hand side” (of
a given formula).
In the case of the dialogical reconstructions of the fourth and seventh viewpoints,
moves will be augmented to expressions of the form X-fe-s where X-fe is as before
and s is a scenario.
2.3 Particle rules
Particle rules give an abstract description of the local meaning of logical constants. It
is abstract in the sense that it is completely independent from any particular game
situation. Moreover, they are symmetric, that is independent from the identity of the
players. The local meaning is given by means of describing how a formula stated by X,
given its main logical constant, can be challenged by Y and defended by X.
Utterance 〈X - ϕ ∨ ψ〉 〈X - ϕ ∧ ψ〉 〈X - ϕ→ ψ〉 〈X - ¬ϕ〉
Challenge 〈Y - ?∨〉 〈Y - ?L〉 〈Y - ϕ〉 〈Y - ϕ〉
or 〈Y - ?R〉
Defence 〈X - ϕ〉 〈X - ϕ〉 〈X - ψ〉 −
or 〈X - ψ〉 or 〈X - ψ〉
Utterance 〈X - ∃xϕ〉 〈X - ∀xϕ〉
Challenge 〈Y - ?∃〉 〈Y - ?k〉
Defence 〈X - ϕ[x/k]〉 〈X - ϕ[x/k]〉
Utterance 〈X - ∃Xϕ〉 〈X - ∀Xϕ〉
Challenge 〈Y - ?∃〉 〈Y - ?Pi 〉
Defence 〈X - ϕ[X/Pi]〉 〈X - ϕ[X/Pi]〉
Where Pi ∈ R.
There are no particle rules for atomic formulas.
Moves can be utterances, challenges or defences. Utterances always involve formulas,
defences too, but challenges not necessarily so.
Definition 6 (Choice) We say that a player makes a choice when he performs one
move among several moves which are authorized by the same particle rule, except for
particle rules for (second-order and first-order) quantification48.
In the tables above, X can choose between ϕ and ψ when defending a disjunction.
Conversely, Y can choose which attack he performs against a conjunction.
2.4 Structural rules
Structural rules determine the general organization of the game by providing the fol-
lowing information:
- Who begins
47 We often omit to write ‘!’.
48 See structural rule SR2.
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- Which moves are authorized and which are not depending on some game situations.
- How victory and defeat are decided.
The dialogical approach to the theory of viewpoints concerns the second type of
rule, by which some moves are authorized or not. In what follows we start by presenting
structural rules for standard dialogics. After that we introduce those rules which will
be needed in order to apply the dialogical framework to the seven viewpoints.
2.4.1 Usual structural rules
The usual structural rules determine how a game begins, how it is played, in which
case it is won or lost by a player, and some restrictions on authorized moves.
SR0 Starting rule. Let Σ be a set of formulas and ϕ a formula. D(Σ,ϕ), the dialogue
for ϕ given Σ, starts by O uttering successively the members of Σ after which P utters ϕ,
which is called the thesis of the game.
The thesis is numbered 0. If relevant, the n utterances by O of the n members in Σ are
labelled Σi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. O and P play successively (which means that odd numbers are
always associated with O moves and that P moves are always even). Every move after the
thesis is an answer (namely a challenge or a defence) to a previous move, according to the
particle rules and allowed by the other structural rules.
SR1 Classical Round Closure rule (SR1c)49. Whenever he has a turn to play, X
can challenge a complex formula previously uttered by Y or defend against any previous Y
challenge, so far that the other rules allow it.
SR2 Repetition rule. After P uttered the thesis, O and P both chose a natural number
(resp. n and m) named their repetition rank. Provided the other rules allow it, O (resp. P) may
challenge or defend any single token of an utterance at most n (resp. m) times.
The proviso that other rules allow such repetitions is important. In particular, the
Round Closure rule prevails against the Repetition rule. Consider the Intuitionistic
version of the Round Closure: no matter his repetition rank, P is not allowed to defend
against a O-challenge which is not the last non-answered one.
SR3 Formal rule. P is allowed to utter an atomic formula if and only if O uttered it
beforehand.
SR4 Winning rule. A subdialogue is closed if and only if it contains a X utterance of an
atomic formula and a Y utterance of the same atomic formula. A dialogue is closed if and only
if all its subdialogues are closed. A (sub)dialogue is finished iff it is closed or no further move is
allowed by the rules. The Proponent wins a (sub)dialogue iff it is closed. The Opponent wins
a (sub)dialogue iff it is finished and not closed.
2.4.2 Structural rules and naya-va¯da
We interpret the theoretical differences between the viewpoints as variations on struc-
tural rules so that we obtain seven dialogical systems, one for each viewpoint. The idea
is that the constraints put on players moves must vary from one dialogical system to
another, and these variations are due to the different theoretical positions we presented
in section 1.
The universal-particular viewpoint. Partisans of the first viewpoint consider that
there are two different kinds of objects, namely universals and particulars. Thus, a
49 There are two versions for the Round Closure rule. The other version is Intuitionistic Round
Closure rule:
(SR1i). Whenever he has a turn to play, X can challenge a complex formula previously uttered by
Y or defend against the last non-answered Y challenge, so far that the other rules allow it.
Dialogical logic was originally developed in relation to Intuitionistic logic. We found no evidence in
the texts we studied that one or the other version should be preferred for Jain logic.
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statement of the form ‘k is P ’ is understood as dealing with two objects: the particular
object k and the property denoted by the predicate P . Now it is the Opponent who
settles the appropriate sort of predicates to be used. The upshot for this idea is that
the Proponent can use a predicate only if the Opponent introduced it beforehand:
SR5 Commitment to Properties Rule. P can use a predicate P only if O used
P previously to challenge a universal (second-order) quantifier or to defend an existential
(second-order) quantifier.
This rule makes use of the dialogical approach to quantifiers where, to use the
happy formulation of Fontaine, to be is to be chosen50.
The summarizing viewpoint. The dialogical system for the second viewpoint also
features Commitment to Properties. However there are two differences between this
viewpoint and the first one. First, the summarizing viewpoint considers that only uni-
versals are the objects of knowledge: contrary to the first viewpoint, statements do not
involve a multiplicity. In other words there is only one sort of quantification. Since the
second viewpoint disregards particulars, sentences such as There is a particular... are
unassertable.
SR6 No First-Order Quantification Rule. No first-order quantification is allowed.
Notice that individual terms remain and can occur in formulas. However, partic-
ularity is disregarded at the second viewpoint: objects sharing the same property are
indistinguishable. As we mentioned in section 1, this can be expressed by a rule which
allows uttering the equality of two terms with respect to a predicate. Here is the precise
formulation of this structural rule:
SR-N2 Summarizing Rule. Whenever X uttered Pki and Pkj in the same subdialogue,
Y can ask X to utter ki
P≈ kj in this subdialogue.
We use
P≈ for indistinguishableness with respect to property P . As a result, standard
substitution is not allowed in the dialogical system for the second viewpoint. More
precisely, only the following forms of substitution are available: (i) if k1
P≈ k2, then
one can substitute k1 with k2 in Pk1 and (ii) one can substitute k1 with k2 in any
expression only if k1 and k2 are indistinguishable for every predicate.
The viewpoint of worldly transactions. As we mentioned in the first section, the re-
construction of the third viewpoint could be seen as a special case of the reconstruction
of the fourth one. For the sake of simplicity, we do not delve into the inner structure
of intermediate particulars and our reconstruction assumes no other devices than the
ones provided by first-order logic. Once again, contrary to the dialogical system for the
first viewpoint, only one sort of quantification is allowed. But contrary to the second
viewpoint, the viewpoint of worldly transactions regards intermediate particulars, and
not universals, as the primary objects of knowledge. Accordingly sentences such as
There is a property... are unassertable. Thus:
SR7 No Second-Order Quantification Rule. No second-order quantification is al-
lowed.
Since second-order quantification is ruled out, we need to provide another device
for the idea that O settles the predicates to be used. Starting from this viewpoint, we
thus assume that before P states the thesis, O settles which predicates can be used
thanks to a list of initial concessions.
The viewpoint of ultimate particulars. We need a sophisticated framework in which
scenarios are taken into account (scenarios can be thought of as time-space points).
50 See [2].
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Before giving further details, let us recall that the viewpoint of ultimate particulars
also allows only first-order quantification. In other words, the dialogical system for this
viewpoint features SR7. Now each scenario has a domain of ultimate particulars. Those
are denoted by a new type of terms which are of the form fsi . Such a term is interpreted
as the name of the value of a (partial) function f at scenario si
51. Such functions denote
individuals in the usual sense and are sometimes called individuating functions. In our
terminology they denote intermediate particulars. This system of functions can serve
to draw world-lines indicating which ultimate particulars in which scenarios pertain to
the same intermediate particular. But the fourth viewpoint considers that intermediate
particulars are not the object of knowledge. The primary objects of knowledge are the
elements of different domains, and they are incomparable. Indeed the use of terms
is strictly constrained by scenarios such that two terms fsi and fsj are substitutable
at scenario si if and only if fsi = fsj at scenario si. The following rules cast the
world-lines approach to first order logic described above in the dialogical framework:
SR-N4 Strict Use of Terms Rule. 1. Suppose X uttered fsi = fsj at si. Whenever X
utters at si a formula ϕ in which fsi occurs, Y can ask X to substitute some occurrences of
fsi with occurrences of fsj at si.
2. P can choose a term fsi at some scenario if and only if:
a. fsi is new, or
b. O previously chose it at the same scenario.
We also have to pay attention that the usual structural rules must take account
of scenarios. For example, the suitable Formal Rule (SR3) states that P can utter an
atomic formula at a scenario si if and only if O uttered this formula at si previously.
It could be the case that two ultimate particulars are different values of the same
function. In such case the individuating function serves to draw a world-line between
such two ultimate particulars. We could implement such a device in the dialogical
system for the third viewpoint. We would then have to specify that the primary objects
of knowledge are denoted by the functions. We would also have to add criteria (for
example factual knowledge) granting that world-lines can be drawn between different
ultimate particulars. But world-lines and criteria for drawing those are not the primary
concern of the fourth viewpoint.
The last three viewpoints pay much more attention to the linguistic characteristics
of terms denoting particulars. It is unclear if quantification should be allowed for these
viewpoints. Siddhars.igan. i’s text is too brief to take up the issue with the necessary
precision. Thus we will restrict the discussion to the use of singular terms: anyway,
Siddhars.igan. i’s examples for these viewpoints are based on the use of (proper) names.
Our language offers one possibility to give an account for this use by introducing definite
descriptions of the form (ιx)(Px). We should also deal with indefinite descriptions, but
we will not treat them for the sake of simplicity.
The viewpoint of synonymy. The framework for the fifth viewpoint assumes that
some descriptions convey synonymous meanings, so that different descriptions can
name one and the same object. Thus we assume that in addition to the predicates
51 In fact indexes are determined by the scenario where the function has been chosen. More gen-
erally this could happen for any term. The point is that we could have at a scenario the name of an
ultimate particular that does not manifest in the scenario at stake. The name of this particular does
not name any actual ultimate particular. What to do with utterances involving such terms? Since
the underlying philosophy assumes that knowledge is about what is here and now, it looks that the
result should be that the player who performs utterances involving them will not be able to respond
to a challenge against these utterances. On the other hand, the very point of the fourth viewpoint
is that one can have names of actual ultimate particulars without knowing which intermediate par-
ticular they constitute. However this is a completely other case and does not prevent occurrence of
justified assertions involving such kind of ultimate particulars.
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which can be used, O also grants a list of synonymies between predicates, where syn-
onymy is denoted by ∼. Now we can formulate a form of substitution based on such
synonymies:
SR-N5 Substitution of Synonyms Rule. Suppose P ∼ Q has been conceded. In the
course of the game, whenever X utters a formula in which P occurs, Y can demand X to utter
the formula resulting from substituting every occurrence of P with Q.
This applies for example to definite descriptions: if P ∼ Q, (ιx)(Px) can be sub-
stituted with (ιx)(Qx). If we consider that P stands for having divine supremacy and
that Q stands for having the ability to destroy the strongholds, we obtain Siddhars.igan. i’s
own example about Indra and Purandara. Synonymy between two predicates means
that they are dialogically indistinguishable: if one wins/looses in a debate in which P
occurs, one can substitute P with Q and the outcome will not change.
The viewpoint of semantic analysis. Contrary to the preceding one, this viewpoint
assumes that there is a one-to-one correspondence between descriptions and objects:
one name (or description)-one object (there is no synonymy). Accordingly the dialogical
framework for this viewpoint disallows substitution between predicates. Thus O does
not grant synonymy and SR-N5 is ruled out:
SR-N6 One description-one name Rule. Players cannot substitute a predicate with
another one.
The such-like viewpoint. Finally, the seventh viewpoint also denies that various
names can denote the same object. Moreover, additional constraints are put on the
conditions under which an object can be named by a given expression. A name k can
be used to designate a particular at this moment if and only if k means that there is a
(unique) x such that Px and the designated object has this property at this moment.
Thus the dialogical reconstruction for this viewpoint features temporal scenarios (for
the temporal indexation) and the following rule:
SR-N7 Indexed Designation Rule. 1. Before P utters the thesis, O concedes a list of
identities of the form k = (ιx)(Px) without temporal indexation.
2. Starting from the thesis, moves are labelled with temporal scenarios, and all the usual rules
must take those into account.
3. Whenever X utters a (possibly complex) formula ϕ in which k occurs, Y can challenge the
formula by questioning k (?k). Suppose k = (ιx)(Px) has been conceded. The proper defence
for Y is to utter Pk.
It is crucial that the identities conceded by O are not indexed by temporal scenarios.
It is only at the level of the justification of the use of a name k that the temporal
indexes are used. Notice that the second and third parts of the rule literally expresses
the double constraint we formulated informally: the two conditions are that k indeed
means that There is an x such that... and that one can utter k has the property of...
at a given temporal scenario.
2.5 An example
Given the presentation of the viewpoints in Section 1 and the rules we just designed,
we can associate each viewpoint with the following sets of structural rules, in addition
to the particle rules:
– The universal-particular viewpoint: {SR0, SR1, SR2, SR3, SR4, SR5}
– The summarizing viewpoint: {SR0, SR1, SR2, SR3, SR4, SR5, SR6, SR-N2}
– The viewpoint of worldly conventions: {SR0, SR1, SR2, SR3, SR4, SR7}
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– The viewpoint of ultimate particulars: {SR0, SR1, SR2, SR3, SR4, SR7, SR-N4}
– The viewpoint of synonymy: {SR0, SR1, SR2, SR3, SR4, SR7, SR-N5}
– The viewpoint of semantic analysis: {SR0, SR1, SR2, SR3, SR4, SR7, SR-N6}
– The such-like viewpoint: {SR0, SR1, SR2, SR3, SR4, SR7, SR-N7}
Let us give an example of a formula played following two different dialogical sys-
tems. Consider the following two dialogues, the first being played with the rules for
the second viewpoint (with Summarizing Rule) and the second with rules for the third
viewpoint (without Summarizing Rule).
O P
n = 1 m = 2
((Pk1 ∧ Pk2)→ (k1 P≈ k2)) 0
1 Pk1 ∧ Pk2 0 k1 P≈ k2 8
3 Pk1 1 ?L 2
5 Pk2 1 ?R 4
7 k1
P≈ k2 ?
k1
P≈k2
6
Explanations. The numbers in the external columns represent the order in which
moves are performed. When a move is a challenge, the number of the move it challenges
is indicated in the suitable middle column (for example: move 1 is a challenge against
move 0). Players choose their repetition rank m and n immediately after P utters the
thesis. But these ranks play no role in our example. In this dialogue, P cannot answer
immediately to O’s first move: according to the Particle Rule for material implication,
he is supposed to utter k1
P≈ k2 (the consequent of the thesis). But this is an atomic
formula, and the Formal Rule (SR3) forbids him to utter it at this moment of the game.
Thus he counter-attacks with move 2 and the game proceeds up to move 7. Once O
herself utters k1
P≈ k2, P can come back and use it to answer to O’s first move.
This illustrates that in a dialogue defences are always written in front of the relevant
challenges, and keeping track of the order of moves proves useful in such cases. The
dialogue is closed: P wins.
O P
((Pk1 ∧ Pk2)→ (x P≈ y)) 0
n = 1 m = 2
1 Pk1 ∧ Pk2 0
3 Pk1 1 ?L 2
5 Pk2 1 ?R 4
Explanations. In the second dialogue, the Summarizing Rule (SR-N2) is not avail-
able thus P cannot ask O to utter (k1
P≈ k2). In other words, he cannot play move 6 of
the first dialogue, therefore he is unable to answer O’s first move either. The dialogue
is finished but not closed: P looses.
3 Towards a dialogical framework for Jain logic
So far we presented elements for a dialogical reconstruction of the Jain theory. We
pointed out different tasks to achieve in order to refine the reconstruction, e.g. designing
a more sophisticated framework for the third viewpoint or implementing indefinite
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descriptions. Let us postpone these tasks. The purpose of this section is to describe
the next big step towards a unified (dia)logic of disputes.
The Jain project goes beyond the naya-va¯da. Recall that according to the Jainas,
schools associated with viewpoints are defective in the sense that they do not acknowl-
edge that their own perspective is only one among other possible ones. The theory ‘of
what arguably is’ (sya¯dva¯da) is meant to overcome these defects by providing a theory
of disputation in which the different viewpoints can be taken into account. Our next
research project is therefore to extend our approach into a unified reconstruction of
Jain logic. The sya¯dva¯da consists in considering predication as conditioned. Thanks to
the ‘operator’ sya¯t, Jain logicians can list seven modes of predication (saptabhan˙g¯ı):
– Arguably it is so and so (sya¯dastyeva)
– Arguably it is not so and so (sya¯dna¯styeva)
– Arguably it is so and so, arguably it is not so and so (sya¯dastyeva sya¯dna¯styeva)
– Arguably it is unassertable (sya¯davaktavyameva)
– Arguably it is so and so, arguably it is unassertable (sya¯dastyeva sya¯davaktavyam-
eva)
– Arguably it is not so and so, arguably it is unassertable (sya¯dna¯styeva sya¯davak-
tavyameva)
– Arguably it is so and so, arguably it is not so and so, arguably it is unassertable
(sya¯dastyeva sya¯dna¯styeva sya¯davaktavyameva)
The optative sya¯t is translated as ‘arguably’, following [3]. We also follow Ganeri in
interpreting it as the way to relativize what follows to some viewpoint. As we already
stressed out, the Jain theory concerns objects, so in the list above, ‘it’ refers to some
object at stake. We use ‘unassertable’ for ‘avaktavyam’ which literally means ‘which
is not to be said’. Thus ‘it is unassertable’ is a shortcut for ‘it cannot be said to be
so and so nor not to be so and so’. Following [3] we see ‘sya¯t ’ as the means by which
predication is conditioned: intuitively, we may read it as There is a viewpoint such
that.... At first sight, ‘sya¯t ’ seems to be some kind of possibility operator (in the sense
of standard modal logic), and in the semantics proposed by Priest in [15] it is treated
this way.
However, such an approach does not seem to match the use of ‘sya¯t ’. For ‘sya¯t ’ is
not meant to be iterated: as far as we know, the Jain logicians were not interested with
statements of the form There is a viewpoint at which there is a viewpoint at which....
The reason for this is that each viewpoint attempts to deal with what is the case (here
Jainas would add ‘according to this viewpoint’), not with what could have been the
case. In fact the sya¯t operator is rather an existential quantifier on viewpoints which
is not embedded in a modal frame structured with a set of possible worlds and acces-
sibility relations. Furthermore, the following points are crucial:
1. A viewpoint is not some unspecified element of a set of possible worlds. Each view-
point is characterized by a precise underlying logic (and theory of knowledge).
2. The sya¯t operator does not take just any formula in its scope. The formulae of which
it can be predicated that they are unassertable or so and so etc., are those which are
dependent upon the rules that characterize the logic of each viewpoint. Namely:
– Restricted second-order existential generalization (first viewpoint),
– Identity by Summarizing (second viewpoint),
– Substitution of particulars (third viewpoint),
– No Substitution of particulars (fourth viewpoint),
22
– Substitution of names of particulars by synonymy (fifth viewpoint),
– Disclosing each name with help of a specific definite description which fixes a unique
object description (sixth viewpoint),
– Naming unique objects by means of temporally parameterized definite descriptions
(seventh viewpoint).
If we follow [3] and interpret ‘sya¯t ’ as There is a viewpoint such that..., and since
we gave dialogical readings of the viewpoints, then the dialogical reading of ‘sya¯t it is
so and so’ should be: ‘there is a dialogical system in which it is so and so’. Or stated
otherwise: there are game rules such that ‘it is so and so’ can be won. Let us write ‘sya¯t
ϕ’ with Sϕ. The dialogical operator S should not be read as a usual alethic possibility,
and thus should not be challenged as usual52 by asking for a context, but by asking
for the rules to use in order to play a dialogue for ϕ. That is, S is not meant to have a
local meaning but a structural influence, by fixing the rules the game must be played
with. The rule for an expression of the form Sϕ is a structural rule of the following
form:
SR-sya¯t. A X expression of the form Sϕ is challenged by Y asking X which rules must
be used to play a dialogue for ϕ. Once X has chosen the rules, Y asks X to utter ϕ.
Now the crucial point is that, given combinations of expressions of the form Sϕ,
the rules can change during a dialogue. Take the third predication mode Arguably it
is so and so, arguably it is not so and so. The dialogue will start with P uttering a
conjunction of expressions containing S, so (by the rules for ∧ and S) he will have to
choose rules two times, and nothing forces him to choose the same rules each time. In
fact, it is strategically better for him to change rules, in order to avoid contradiction.
Let us give an obvious example. Suppose the dialogue starts by P uttering an expression
of the form Sϕ, where ϕ contains second-order quantification. O starts by challenging
S, that is by asking P to choose a dialogical system for the game. Let us consider the
case where P choose any system except the one for the first and second viewpoints, say
the system for the third viewpoint. O then asks P to utter ϕ, but P cannot because
of rule SR7: P looses. Had he chosen the system for the first viewpoint, he could have
at least uttered ϕ.
The preceding remarks suggest that the unified dialogical approach for Jain logic
would implement an additional strategical dimension: the choice of rules when defend-
ing a S operator. Such a dialogical system seems adequate because it can be used to
implement confrontation between different viewpoints.
4 Conclusion
The dialogical framework is, in our view, a promising approach for a contemporary
reconstruction of the Jain contribution to logic. The main reasons for this are linked
to:
1. The notion of meaning at stake. Indeed the dialogical framework allows a recon-
struction of the underlying logic in which a strong connection between meaning and
argumentation furnishes a suitable approach to the interaction between word and ob-
ject.
2. An epistemological claim. The dialogical approach, able to distinguish changes of
meaning at different levels, seems to offer a natural framework for the formulation of
Jain epistemology.
52 More on usual modal dialogics can be found in [8].
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In fact, we proposed a reconstruction of the seven viewpoints of the naya-va¯da
by means of seven dialogical systems, each with its own set of structural rules - i.e.
rules that determine global meaning. A set of game rules determine which strategies
are available for a player. Thus each viewpoint can be characterized by a type of
available strategies. In this sense our reconstruction replaces argumentative practices
and strategies at the heart of a contemporary reading of Jain logic. More generally,
according to our view, our approach seems to offer a fine-grained account for the logical
contextualisation process at stake in the Jain theory.
The next step will be to extend the reconstruction in order to implement the
sya¯dva¯da. Ultimately our aim is to provide a unified reconstruction of the (dial)logic
of disputes in Jain epistemology and logic.
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